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The Lundin Report

I. INTRODUCTION

In May 2000, Amnesty International (Amnesty) published “Sudan: The Human Price of Oil” (The Human Price of Oil), an 18-page report on the effect of the operations of the oil industry in Sudan. cclvi The report declares it was published “to make clear the link between the massive human rights violations by the security forces of the Government of Sudan and various government allied militias, and the oil operations by foreign companies.”cclvii Without identifying any particular acts by oil companies, Amnesty International put the case that it “believes many foreign companies tolerate human rights violations by turning a blind eye to the human rights violations committed against local communities by government forces or government-allied troops” in an effort to “control, protect or destroy the oil production capacity.”cclviii

Amnesty International produced a report that is part advocacy and partly an attempt to encourage corporate responsibility for the improvement of human rights of the citizens of Sudan. The underlying presumption is that oil companies are cavalier and turn a blind eye, and yet Amnesty makes these statements based on limited discussions with the companies they criticise. Crucially, they fail to acknowledge that the information and material they use, represents one side of the conflict - the SPLA’s and other rebel commanders. There is a major inherent contradiction in what is advocated by Amnesty International, as the oil companies in Sudan were clearly not there to “control, protect or destroy the oil production capacity.”

A careful review of The Human Price of Oil reveals that despite its claim “to make clear the link” to human rights violations as a result of the oil operations of the foreign companies, the report fails to deliver. The report declares that it is intended to establish a dialogue with oil companies, raising concerns about the responsibility the companies should have in promoting a better human rights environment in the area where they are active in extracting oil.cclix For that reason and on the basis of the observations set out below, the report should not be relied upon as evidence in an international criminal investigation, or trial, as it was never written for this purpose or intended to be used in such a manner.

 

II. CONTRADICTIONS

Amnesty International recognises in its section entitled “Background to the Problem” that Sudan has been at war with itself for much of the last half a century and that the conflict was fought not only between the Sudanese government and the SPLA but involved other factions.cclx  The reportacknowledges that the conflict that accounted for the majority of the casualties, was between the various factions allied with the government or the SPLA, that frequently changed sides depending on their perceived personal interests, the possibility of more power or simply the supply of arms, as opposed to ideological differences.cclxi As the report maintains “more people have lost their lives in interfactional fighting amongst Southerners than in armed encounters with government forces.” To put the context of this kaleidoscopic conflict into one that holds foreign oil companies as responsible is a clear misrepresentation of the history of Sudan.

The report does not address the rights of the Government of Sudan to the oil discovered within its

sovereign territory and the entitlement of the state to exploit it for the benefit of its economy. The report is critical of the fact that the development of the oil fields provides the state of Sudan with ‘new-found wealth’ that gives it the ability to purchase arms without taking into account that a majority of the revenues were to flow back to the southern states, under the terms of the KPA.cclxii Amnesty International’s stance in parts of the report is avowedly anti-government and does not grapple with the rights of a state over its territory. Such complex issues are avoided, although they are central to the situation in Sudan.

Rather than establishing the clear link it proclaimed in its title and introduction, The Human Price of Oil concedes that Amnesty International takes no position for or against oil exploration or commercial enterprises per se, and that it is not always possible to draw a direct, causal connection between oil exploration or a company’s activities and human rights violations in its geographical area of activity.cclxiii Instead, Amnesty International states that it is concerned that oil exploration may be used as a justification for the forcible displacement of local populations pursuant to human rights violations committed by security forces. The report also does not provide any reasons or address the question of why such violations might in any way be pursued by an oil company, nor what purpose this would serve.

 

III. LUNDIN

As far as Lundin is concerned, the report does not provide any linkage evidence between the events on the ground and any of the Company’s actions. Rather, the report relies on second-hand accounts from journalists with known partisan links and an interview with a militia commander. In short, Amnesty International’s report, which seeks to vilify an entire industry against a backdrop of inter-tribal conflict, lacks objectivity and rigorous methodology. Contrary to its statements, Amnesty International seems to have turned a blind eye to this lack of objectivity in its report and the ends served by the sources it relied upon.

 

IV. FLAWS IN METHODOLOGY

Amnesty International’s report fails to withstand proper scrutiny as a source of evidence in a criminal investigation for the reasons set out below.

(i) Partial Reporting: One Biased Interviewee (Peter Gadet)

The report refers specifically to only one interview, conducted with a partial source – who was a party to the conflicts, Peter Gadet.cclxiv Peter Gadet’s value as a source is questionable insofar as he has been placed on the EU’s sanctions list following reports of atrocities committed in 2014.cclxv The US also added him to their sanctions list in May 2014.cclxvi The partiality of the report can be seen from the fact that Amnesty International failed to disclose the detail of the true background of this source. Such disclosure, had it been made, would have caused impartial observers to look critically at Peter Gadet’s allegations against the Sudanese government and foreign oil companies and concluded it was nothing more than self-serving propaganda. It is noteworthy that Amnesty International’s condemnation of the alleged use of child soldiers does not extend in this report to Peter Gadet, who was accused just a month later by the NGO of having led forces, who reportedly used child soldiers below the age of 18 in combat. If that information had been included in the report on the oil industry, it would have inevitably led to the questioning of the reliability of the source.

No information is given as to how, or why, the sole interviewee, Peter Gadet, as a rebel commander was selected. The interview took place in October 1999 in Wicok village and would have required whoever conducted it to liaise with the SPLA for access. The report does not inform the reader as to how this was achieved, nor the circumstances in which the interview was conducted or recorded. Wicok is not a location within Lundin’s Block 5A.

In the report, Peter Gadet is the source of putative information on displacement from villages around Koch (not situated near the All-Weather Road) and Leer caused by fighting between different Nuer factions.

(ii) Lack of Balance in Reporting

Amnesty International did not interview a representative of the Government of Sudan for the purpose of researching or writing its report nor any of the oil companies active in the concession blocks and visits the relevant sites. Its almost exclusive focus on allegations of government involvement and the commission of human rights abuses demonstrates a lack of impartial reporting and distortion of the situation.

The report states that it is designed to “establish a dialogue with foreign oil companies regarding the protection and promotion of human rights where they are active in extracting oil.”cclxvii It refers to Amnesty receiving “inaccurate” letters from the Company and other companies active in the area stating there to be: “no settlements in the oil-rich areas and that allegations of mass displacement are therefore inaccurate”. The report does not however engage with the oil companies’ responses in any meaningful way. Instead, it summarily dismisses the claims without investigation, stating only that “this is clearly not so”, notwithstanding the plainly biased source it was relying upon for information.

Amnesty’s description of the conflict perpetuates the narrative of a north/south civil war and portrays the SPLM/A incorrectly as victims of Khartoum’s machinations, rather than looking into the complexity of the situation, where inter-tribal and inter-factional fighting were rife. This lack of understanding and balance is one of the reasons why international courts do not rely on such information in criminal proceedings. See Chapter 9.

Amnesty presents a selective telling of the story of conflict in Sudan and omits any mention of the

underlying tensions in the relationship between John Garangcclxviii and Riek Machar,cclxix as well as various other local leaders that had driven the divisions throughout the 1990s cclxx and exploited ethnicity and tribal allegiances to further their own agendas.cclxxi

(iii) Lack of First-Hand Reporting, Hearsay and Non-Substantiation of Allegations

Other than the visit to Wicok village and the Gadet interview, the report is not based upon any direct fieldwork or first-hand research in Sudan in 2000. Amnesty did not visit Block 5A, nor did it visit any of the locations cited. It provided only anecdotal observations.cclxxii Neither does the report explain how information was obtained about these locations.

The report relies upon information from un-namedcclxxiii and secondary sources, that are limited and subjective. The report references five news articles;cclxxiv a World Food Programme press release;cclxxv one documentary video;cclxxvi John Harker’s Report; and a Talisman letter from its CEO.cclxxvii Amnesty’s reliance on hearsay contained in newspaper articles to support serious allegations of international crimes demonstrates a poor and inadequate forensic approach.cclxxviii

The documentary video referenced in Amnesty’s report is: “Blood for Oil in Southern Sudan” by Damien Lewiscclxxix in which Lewis and Baroness Cox are hosted and provided with information by one party to the conflicts – the SPLA. Their justification for siding with a party to the conflicts is notably absent from the film.

Allegations concerning individuals killed and displaced as well as the use of child soldiers by some of the oil companies to provide security are made in the report without footnoting or referencing sources. Unsubstantiated allegations are made about security for Lundincclxxx and an alleged “pattern of gross human rights violations in those areas in which foreign oil companies have exploitation rights.”cclxxxi

 

Other allegations made are not substantiated by the sources cited in Amnesty’s report.cclxxxii Amnesty International does not document, reference or footnote the “numerous reports” it claims to have received of “massive forcible displacements of populations, testimonies about government security forces and government-allied troops carrying out aerial bombardments and strafing villages from helicopter gunships.”cclxxxiii There is therefore no way of scrutinising these unreferenced statements. Amnesty International concedes that it has not been able to confirm these reports due to a lack of access to the area.cclxxxiv

Amnesty’s report also makes a somewhat disconnected reference to famine and displacement, framing this as an issue exacerbated by the government due to its flight ban. Amnesty attempts to connect these actions to those of oil companies, despite the lack of a factual or legal nexus.cclxxxv Famine is a political issue and one in which the SPLM/A bore heavy responsibility as seen in Bahr el-Ghazal in 1998.cclxxxvi

The lack of objectivity and impartiality throughout Amnesty’s report is apparent. The making of serious allegations against Lundin on the basis of poor, unattributed sources and non-existent methodology distorts the reality of the situation in southern Sudan. Although Amnesty International claims to take no position “on economic or other sanctions, disinvestment or boycotts,”cclxxxvii in fact it produced a highly partisan piece of advocacy, designed for a western audience to engender campaigns against foreign oil companies. As Alex de Waal, a British researcher on African politics has observed: “There is a scarcity of industry standards and professional regulation in the NGO sector.”cclxxxviii This is evident in Amnesty’s report.

Other NGOs which followed in the footsteps of Amnesty International inappropriately relied on its report although it was a document which was never intended to be and is not fit for purpose as a source of evidence in a criminal investigation or trial.cclxxxix

V. CONCLUSION

The Amnesty report does not provide any linkage evidence between the events on the ground and any action/inaction by Lundin or its representatives. The report relies on second-hand accounts from journalists with known partisan links and an interview with a militia commander, Peter Gadet. The fact that Amnesty does not refer to him and the SPLM/A as its main source of information seriously undermines the credibility of its report.

Amnesty did not visit Block 5A, nor any of the locations it cites, providing only anecdotal observations. Findings against Lundin are made on the basis of poor, unattributed sources and inadequate methodology.

cclvii

Ib., p.2.

cclviii

Ib.

cclix

Ib.

cclx

Ib.

cclxi

Ib., p.3.

cclxii

Ib., at p.9.

cclxiii

Ib., at p.8.

cclxiv

The Human Price of Oil, p.4, 5 and 8, which refers to an interview with Peter Gadet conducted during

an Amnesty International visit to Wicok Village in October 1999.

cclxv

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/402 of 7th March 2017, Implementing Article 20(3) of

Regulation (EU) 2015/735 concerning restrictive measures in respect of the situation in South Sudan. See:

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0402&from=EN

cclxvi

Statement from the Press Center of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury Targets Those

Engaged in Violence and Atrocities in South Sudan’, dated 5.6.2014: https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/

press-releases/Pages/jl2386.aspx

cclxvii

The Human Price of Oil, p.2.

cclxviii

John Garang de Mabior Atem Aruai became chairman and commander in chief of the SPLM/A at its

inception in 1983. Born 23 June 1945. A Twic Dinka from the village of Wangkulei. Graduated in Economics

from Grinnell University, Iowa and studied African Agricultural Economics as a Thomas J Watson Fellow at the University of Dar es Salaam. Met Yoweri Museveni while at University. Captain John Garang de Maboirreceived advanced military trained at Fort Benning, Georgia, USA (1974-75). Received his MA and PhD from Iowa State University focused on rural development. Fought as part of the Anya Nya movement preceding the SPLM/A. Killed in a helicopter crash in 2005. Long-standing tension existed between Garang’s forces and

others factional groups stemming from the split in the SPLM/A in 1991.

cclxix

Dr Riek Machar, Nuer from Leer. The 26th child of 32. Attended an American missionary school. Gained a

PhD from Bradford Polytechnic, UK. Rebel leader in the SPLM/A in the 1980s but broke from Garang in 1991

with Dr Lam Akol and Gordon Kong to form the SPLM/A-Nasir.

cclxx

Kastfelt (eds) 2004, p.45, “continued unwillingness of Garang and Machar to resolve their personal and political difference for the greater good of the South”.

cclxxi

Peter Adwok Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s View (2000) p.51: “As such, when contradictions within the SPLM/A arose again, triggered off by the Nasir attempted coup, many Nuers saw the split that ensued as a result of Nuer-Dinka tribal animosity as an opportunity to revenge against the Bor Dinka.” See also HRW (1993), Civilian Devastation, Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan, p.4: “The leaders of the SPLA factions must address their own human rights problems and correct their own abuses, or risk a continuation of the war on tribal or political grounds in the future.”

cclxxii

The Human Price of Oil, p.2:

The following description from Deborah Scroggins highlights the challenges of moving around Sudan and meeting people: “Emma soon learned that the Land Cruiser would not take her far in a land without roads.

If she wanted to find the people, she would have to go into the villages on foot. Towns were alien to the Nilotic peoples, who moved from season to season with their beloved long-horned cattle. From November

to March or April, they lived in the grasslands close to the rivers. From April to October, when the rains came

and the rivers flooded, turning the grassy plains to marsh, they moved to permanent villages of conical

thatched houses on higher ground.” Scroggins, Emma’s War, (2004), p.139.

cclxxiii

For example, the report relies on the account of an un-named ‘former commander in the forces of rebel leader Paulino Matip’, Report at p.9.

cclxxiv

(BBC 16/05/09); Julie Flint, The Observer (London), March 2000; Reuters [sic], Jan.4,2000; AFP, August

31, 1999 from Gazeta Wyborcza; Al-Sharq al-Aswat, 28 January 2000.

cclxxv

The Human Price of Oil, p.4: New Release, 10 July 1999, WFP, Nairobi.

cclxxvi

Blood for Oil in Southern Sudan by Damien Lewis (Journeyman Pictures).

cclxxvii

The Human Price of Oil, fn 7: ’Letter, written by Alan G. Hevesi to Mr James Buckee, president and

chief executive officer of Talisman Energy, September 27, 1999’.

cclxxviii

Amnesty’s report refers to a newspaper article in The Observer in March 2000 by Julie Flint to support

the allegation that ‘government troops cleared the area around the town of Bentiu using helicopter

gunships, some allegedly piloted by Iraqi soldiers, and aerial cluster bombardment by high-altitude

Antonov planes.’ This refers in fact to an article she wrote in April 2000, not March 2000.

cclxxix

‘Blood for Oil in Southern Sudan’ - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3_KqkeVHGrs

In De Waal, Alex, Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 2005 (revised edition), pp.21-22, refers to the phenomenon

of ‘Disaster Tourists’, which is relevant for this particular source Amnesty cites as do others (for example, HRW 2003 – Sudan, Oil and Human Rights) rely on: “… the biases serve not to hide poverty but to exaggerate it. Disaster tourists are typically journalists in search of a story, relief workers trying to make an assessment of need or politicians in search of an image that combines action and compassion.” De Waal goes on to list a series of biases that distort what is seen and reflections/representations”.

cclxxx

The Human Price of Oil, p.12. for example: ‘IPC has allegedly employed a local security team, mainly comprised of local Nuer fighters reportedly trained by a private military and security company. IPC later suspended its military operations because of the instability in the area. The constantly changing allegiances of local militia forces meant that the security of IPC could not be guaranteed by these forces’.

cclxxxi

Ib., p.7.

cclxxxii

Amnesty say that “20,000 people reported missing in the oilfield areas by the WPF [sic], have since

been reported to be living in neighbouring counties”. Given there was a low presence of NGOs in Western Upper Nile at this time it is unknown where this information comes from. The WFP bulletin referred to also does not contain this information or references oil: https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-bulletin-no-94-04-10-jul-1999

cclxxxiii

The Human Price of Oil. p.7.

cclxxxiv

Ib., p.12.

cclxxxv

Ib., p.16.

cclxxxvii

The Human Price of Oil, p.16.

cclxxxviii

De Waal, Alex, Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, (2002), p. 80

cclxxxix

Christian Aid, Scorched Earth, 2001; Georgette Gagnon & John Ryle, Report of an Investigation into Oil

Development in Western Upper Nile, Sudan 2001; Human Rights Watch: Sudan Oil & Human Rights, 2003;

ECOS Unpaid Debt 2010; Sudan Research, Analysis & Advocacy, Eric Reeves, 2004 -

https://sudanreeves.org/2004/12/14/amnesty-international-report-on-oil-development-in-sudan-may-3-2000/ ; Eric Reeves, Oil, Development in Sudan, Review of African Political Economy, Vol.29, No.91, p.167-169.

Chapter 5:

Amnesty International: Sudan – The Human Price of Oil, May 2000

A Report On The Lundin Case

9BR CHAMBERS & RPC SOLICITORS

A Report On The Lundin Case

9BR CHAMBERS & RPC SOLICITORS

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