I. INTRODUCTION

None of the advocacy reports analysed in this Report refer to the level of cooperation that was necessary between NGOs (Christian Aid, ECOS, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) and the rebel movement, the SPLM/A, in order for them to carry out their work in southern Sudan. The SPLM/A created a powerful propaganda machine that had international resonance particularly around the issues of religious persecution and references made to ‘oil wars’.

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None of the reports set out the nature of the relationship between the NGOs, the Sudan Relief and

Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA) and the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) – both of which were intimately linked with the SPLM/A and referred to as the “relief” and “spiritual” wings of the rebel movement. Ultimately, this lack of transparency impacts the reliability and impartiality of the NGO reports.

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This chapter provides information on the humanitarian aid situation in Southern Sudan that saw cooperation with the SRRA and the NSCC and highlights the SPLM/A’s level of influence on outside agencies.

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II. SPLM/A AND OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS)

“Unprecedented recognition” of the SPLA “both in Sudan and internationally” was extended by Operation Lifeline Sudan, which began in 1989. OLS was a consortium of UN agencies and approximately 35 NGOs operating in southern Sudan to provide humanitarian relief due to years of

famine and drought. This organisation was set up with the agreement of the Government of Sudan, which agreed that humanitarian aid should be provided throughout Sudan, including rebel held territories. The OLS “provided aid resources into the heart of SPLA-held Sudan (while aid to the [refugee] camps in Ethiopia was also increasing).”cix

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OLS agreed on ground rules with the SPLM/A, which gave considerable legitimacy to the rebel movement. This institutionalized relationship was made operational by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which solidified the SPLA’s position as the sole legitimate force in the south.cx The SPLM/A, which negotiated this MoU through its humanitarian wing, namely the SRRA, started to tax the International Accredited Organizations as though it were a government. In order for assistance agencies and organizations to operate in the southern insurgent-held areas, they had to agree to the SPLA’s terms.cxi

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Aid funnelled through OLS was being manipulated by the SPLM/A to be used for military spending,

which served to further the conflict against the Government of Sudan and internecine conflicts in the south.cxii The SPLA had also started to siphon money from aid operations.cxiii It was noted at the time that: “The US has been the principal supplier of food to the NGOs which in turn supply the areas that are the principal garrisons for the SPLA. The SPLA has always kept a very large supply of Dinka displaced civilians near these garrisons, providing itself with a significant food source.”cxiv

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The OLS has been described as a “propaganda coup” for the SPLA and as “a vehicle for much more favourable publicity, as journalists and diplomats could now visit most parts of the SPLA-held areas in  relative comfort and safety. It was an opportunity that previous liberation movements had only dreamed of.”cxv

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III. SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL AID TO THE SPLA

The SPLM/A benefitted from the significant aid projects provided by foreign countries. The US Government budget for fiscal year 2000 included significant aid provisions for Sudan and the SPLM/A.cxvi

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In the first five months of 2002, “the United States designated over $26 million in foreign assistance to the southern sector of Sudan. This money was officially allocated to health-care services, food relief, infrastructure development, and water and sanitation services.”cxvii However the SPLA was able to control much of the distribution of these resources because any entity, individual or organization working in the “liberated” zones of the south had to pass through the SRRA, its humanitarian agency.

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This arrangement “allowed the SPLA to take credit for services provided to local communities; foreign assistance facilitated the good name that the SPLA was overseeing the distribution of public goods, resulting in an increase of the group’s civic legitimacy.”cxviii During the period between 1997 and 2002, Norwegian People’s Aid paid for the satellite telephone charges of John Garang (the leader of the SPLA from 1983 to 2005) in the amount of USD 1 million.cxix A 1999 documentary by Norway’s NRK (the national broadcaster) alleged that Norwegian People’s Aid allowed the “SPLM to use its planes to transport weapons and landmines to camps in the bush.”cxx In 2000, Norway also provided ‘cash’ payments to the SPLM/A for peace negotiations.cxxi The SPLM/A’s ability to access funds from foreign agencies contributed to its ability to continue its conflicts and international propaganda.

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IV. THE SUDAN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION AGENCY (SRRA)

The SRRA has its origins in 1986 at the Itang Refugee camp in Ethiopia.cxxii Originally, the SRRA, with its office in Nairobi designated itself as an NGO, but later became known as the humanitarian wingcxxiii or “relief wing of the SPLA.”cxxiv Since 1989, it had played an important role in regulating contacts with foreign aid agencies.cxxv The SRRA was a “non-profit humanitarian organization impartial and independent on paper but still answering directly to the leadership of the SPLM/A and staffed largely by seconded or retired SPLM/A officers and officials.”cxxvi The SRRA was largely seen as the service-providing organ of the SPLM/A.cxxvii It was acknowledged that the SPLM held power of approval over NGO decisions to hire and fire staff, with preference given to local staff, often affiliated to either the SPLA or the rebel group’s humanitarian wing, the SRRA. The SPLM also imposed arbitrary taxes on NGO operations, including levies on relief flights. In some cases, the SPLM and SRRA decided to control NGO assets, movements of NGO staff, and project approval.

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The SRRA played a crucial role in the diversion of humanitarian aid to the rebels but the creation of the NSCC and local NGOs also provided more independent interlocutors to international counterparts.cxxviii The SRRA became “officially” independent from the SPLA in March-April 1994.cxxix However, although nominally independent, “the SRRA was responsible for distributing food to needy southerners in the ‘liberated’ zones…and would routinely skim off food and distribute it to soldiers instead.cxxx This was not surprising since most of the SRRA personnel were SPLA officers drawn from the security unit.”cxxxi 

 

The SRRA played a crucial role in terms of the issuance of visas in SPLA-controlled areas.cxxxii Visas were required to visit these areas by international NGOs and could be obtained upon application in Nairobi through the SRRA, by agreement with the SPLM/A.cxxxiii These visas generated income for both the SRRA and the SPLM/A. Any visit to southern Sudan was thereby monitored and managed by the SPLM/A.

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“The SRRA’s autonomy as a relief agency was in doubt from the start, as its office in Nairobi doubled as a liaison office for the SPLM/A, but NGOs aiming to work inside SPLA-controlled Sudan have no option but to work through this office, which approves all projects and handles travel.”cxxxiv

 

The ability of the SRRA and SPLM/A to control the travel, duration and location of the NGO members visiting SPLA-controlled areas was evident.cxxxv Such control inevitably impacted upon the reliability and impartiality of the subsequent reports published by the NGOs.

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V. THE NEW SUDAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (NSCC)

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(i) ORIGIN AND LINKS TO THE SPLA AS THE “SPIRITUAL WING OF THE MOVEMENT”

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In 1989, key church leaders approached John Garang and the SPLM/A about constituting a new council of churches with a “spiritual and administrative mandate for the liberated areas of southern Sudan”.cxxxvi In January 1990, John Garang agreed to their proposal, which had several advantages for the SPLM/A:

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“It improved its [the SPLM/A’s] credential with the industrialised countries, by contriving simultaneously to suggest religious freedom and Christian identity, in contrast to the newly-installed Islamic regime in the North. It hoped this might stimulate western countries to grant aid to the South. At the same time, NSCC would provide convenient channels for assistance particularly from Christian organisations abroad. There was also the role of Christianity as a reinforcement of popular resolve in the struggle.”cxxxvii

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On 17th January 1990, SPLM/A Radio announced the formation of the New Sudan Council of Churches.cxxxviii Formed in Torit, the NSCC was intended to be a “coordinating body formed to facilitate the collective action of South Sudan’s various church denominations…to compensate for the Sudan Council of Churches’ inability to represent its member churches in rebel-controlled areas.”cxxxix 

 

In the public announcement, the “NSCC was described by the spokesman of the SPLM/A as ‘a spiritual wing of the Movement’, suggesting a concern to ensure that churches did not become centres for political dissent.”cxl From the “beginning, the ‘spiritual wing’ was seen very much as a means of obtaining material assistance. NSCC began with a strong relief agenda.”cxli Alex de Waal explains that this “has been viewed as the point at which the SPLA gave Christians official sanction, and freedom to operate.”cxlii John Garang was keen to push for closer ties with the churches to increase his political outreach throughout southern Sudan but also to be able to connect directly with the food and financial aid that was dispersed through the churches.

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It has been suggested that the SPLM/A tolerated the NSCC because leaders of the movement assumed the Council would prove a powerful public relations ally, both inside and outside the country.cxliii According to African Rights, the SPLM/A “hoped this might stimulate western countries to grant aid to the South. At the same time, NSCC would provide convenient channels for assistance particularly from Christian organisations abroad.”cxliv

 

The early years of the NSCC were “fraught with administrative difficulties and division among the

churches.”cxlv In response, partner agencies supplied funds, advice and personnel in many cases.cxlvi From 1990, the headquarters of the NSCC was based in Nairobi and it kept its Secretariat in Torit until  1992 when it had to be evacuated to Nairobi due to fighting between the SPLA and the Government of Sudan.

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Following the fragmentation of the SPLA in 1991, the NSCC launched a Peace Desk in 1992 though the majority of the endeavours undertaken by the Council focused on relief and aid disbursement.

 

(ii) LEADERSHIP

The first Chairman of the NSCC was Bishop Paride Taban, Catholic Bishop of Torit, who is a long standing partner of Pax. The Vice-Chairman was Nathaniel Garang. In 1990, they agreed to the appointment of American Roger Schrock from the Church of the Brethren as Executive Secretary. Schrock was a committed pacifist who “brought a new and challenging biblical and theological approach” that would profoundly shape the future development of the NSCC.cxlvii Schrock played a key role in the “People-to- People” peace conferences.

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(iii) MEMBERSHIP AND FUNDING

The NSCC drew its membership from the churches in southern Sudan, namely the Roman Catholic Church, the Episcopal Church of the Sudan, the Presbyterian Church of the Sudan, the African Inland Church, Sudan Interior Church, and the Pentecostal Church of the Sudan as an associate member. The first committee of the NSCC was held in Ethiopia in 1989.cxlviii 

 

The NSCC Secretariat drew its support from international and local partners. By 1999, it had an annual budget of over three million US dollars, according to one report.cxlix Significant sums of money were sought annually by the NSCC from international funders to facilitate peace conferences for the purpose of “on-going reconciliation” in southern Sudan.cl NSCC updates from 2000 show direct coordination with the SPLM/A in relation to undertaking such peace conferences in their areas of operations, which would have included obtaining visas from the SPLM/A for travel.cli

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(iv) NSCC, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND NGOS

The NSCC held sway over individual congregations and church members and became a sought-after partner by the international community including NGOs.clii

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The NSCC partnered with organisations such as Norwegian Church Aid, DanChurch Aid,cliii Christian Aid, and the Mennonite Central Committee as well as religious groups to win financial and material support for clergy, church members, and the greater Sudanese community.cliv A “substantial amount of the NSCC’s political prowess lay in its ties with international actors, both religious and secular, in addition to the social networks it cultivated in Sudan.”clv The NSCC was expressly thanked in Christian Aid’s Scorched Earth report, published in March 2001. Moreover, financial records from the year 2000 show that Christian Aid financially supported NSCC.clvi Christian Aid provided funding and support for the NSCC’s “People-to-People” peace conferences, which took place in Sudan from 1999.clvii

 

VI. THE NSCC AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USA

Under the early executive directorship of Dr Haruun Ruun, a Sudanese national who became a naturalised U.S. citizen, the NSCC was able to build a relationship with “American churches and agencies that funded peace initiatives.”clviii Rev Tom Glenn, a parish associate of Shandon Presbyterian Church explained that: “The New Sudan Council of Churches really thrived because of that and were able to be the sponsoring agency for a lot of the work for peace.”clix The NSCC developed especially close links with American evangelicals, through its skilful framing of the civil war as a religious conflict.clx

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Dr. Ruun was a key figure in the international movement of the NSCC and was instrumental in public campaigns against oil firms in Sudan.clxi Dr. Ruun’s father was a chief of the 3 million strong Dinka tribe and as a result carried tribal cachet crucial to the southern Sudan political leadership.clxii Dr Ruun resigned his post at the NSCC in 2006 to become special advisor to the President of the interim government in southern Sudan.clxiii

 

Samaritan’s Purse, a Christian relief and development organization, was at the forefront of efforts to place Sudan on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. It was founded by Franklin Graham, described as George Bush’s closest religious confidante.clxiv President George W. Bush declared in 2001 that religious “persecution and atrocities in Sudan” would top his foreign policy agenda.clxv To end Sudan's civil war, with it the persecution of Christians in southern Sudan, would be the primary objective of U.S. foreign policy towards Sudan up until and even after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005.clxvi

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VII. USAID, ‘STAR’, THE SUDAN PEACE FUND, THE NSCC AND CHRISTIAN AID

In 1997, USAIDclxvii set up the Sudan Transitional Assistance Rehabilitation programme (STAR), with the aim of strengthening local capacities and structures and improving human rights and democracy. With the support of USAID and other foreign donors, development activities were launched in the south, which enabled the SPLM/A to enhance its legitimacy both locally with southerners and most importantly with western audiences.clxviii

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At the end of 2002, USAID established the Sudan Peace Fund (SPF), a large programme to encourage and support local initiatives for reconciliation, focusing on economic growth and rehabilitation in communities that had been ravaged by inter-tribal conflict, and for resettlement of internally displaced people. The SPF programme was co-ordinated through a consortium of agencies, including PACT, the NSCC, Christian Aid and the African Union’s Inter-Africa Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR).

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VIII. THE NSCC, SPLA AND THE PEACE CONFERENCES

In the late 1990s, the NSCC established the People-to-People peace processes to address the recurring and increasing number of conflicts amongst the southern warring factions. The 1991 split in the SPLM/A underscored the conflicting interests of the key factional leaders and multiple splinter groups, whose motivations are unclear to date. The peace processes were designed to address conflict amongst the Dinka and Nuer communities.clxix These peace processes involved a series of peace conferences held in southern Sudan and abroad, which involved the cooperation of the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A mandated the NSCC to lead peace and reconciliation efforts in the south, as well as provide chaplains to the armed forces, during a peace conference in Yei, 1997. The result of the Yei meeting was thirty-five Dinka and Nuer chiefs meeting in Lokichokkio in Kenya to discuss conflict and peace in the south. The ‘Loki Accord’ emerged from this meeting and demanded an end to the conflicts taking place among the different tribes. It also demanded that all commanders halt hostile actionsclxx and laid the groundwork for the Wunlit peace conference in March 1999.clxxi

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The aim of the peace conferences was “to collaborate and cooperate in the search for just and lasting peace and freedom for the peoples of New Sudan.”clxxii The Yei Declaration, which resulted from the meeting in 1997 called for “ways and means through which the Church can pursue reconciliation efforts and unity among the political/military groups struggling for the liberation of Southern Sudan.”clxxiii

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The collaboration between the NSCC and the SPLM/A (referred to as a Movement) is underlined in a NSCC Project Proposal for January-June 2000:

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“Peacemaking is the central and most fundamental need in southern Sudan. Until there are agreements for reconciliation and lasting peace, all humanitarian and development assistance is wasted because of ongoing hostilities, conflicts and war. Thus, NSCC, in collaboration with traditional leaders and the Movements, has placed reconciliation and peacemaking at the centre of its mission.”clxxiv

 

An outcome from the peace conferences was the establishment of a Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace Council with three members from each district attending.clxxv The organising meeting for Peace Council Members took place on 7th March 1999. It included Chief Peter Ring Patai – Jikany West (Western Upper Nile) and Chief Tung Guar Kuei Cuong - Leek (Western Upper Nile), both of whom were referenced in the Christian Aidclxxvi and ECOS reports on the situation in Sudan. These individuals were also plaintiffs in the case brought against Talisman in 2001 in America.

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This case saw the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and others filing a lawsuit against the Canadian oil and gas producer, Talisman Energy, under the US Alien Tort Claims Act (Talisman Energy case), claiming that Talisman aided the Government of Sudan in the commission of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The claim against Talisman was for financial compensation. The case was later dismissed by the court on the basis that the Claimants had failed to establish that Talisman “acted with the purpose to support the Government’s offences.”clxxvii In other words, the evidence relied upon did not support the claims and allegations pleaded.

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The Presbyterian Church of Sudan is the largest church among the Nuer and has historic links with the Presbyterian Church in the USA. The Presbyterian Church was also part of peace efforts in the 1990s. For example, the Akobo Peace Conference in 1994 was sponsored by the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and by Reverend Matthew Mathiang Deang who was also a plaintiff in Talisman and was central to these peace and reconciliation efforts.clxxviii

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The Wunlit Peace Conference took place in March 1999. Salva Kiir, the second highest ranking officer in the SPLM/A and Bahr el-Ghazal,clxxix who rose to head the SPLM/A when John Garang was killed in a helicopter crash in 2005 and who later became President of South Sudan, guaranteed the security forthe conference. He and Riek Machar also participated in the opening and closing remarks of the conference at Wunlit but beyond this, their participation was minimised to allow the communities to discuss their grievances and suffering.clxxx The reconciliation negotiated at Wunlit came after years of internecine strife. Grazing rights, abductions, reclaiming land and resources were all key issues addressed and priorities for the working groups to continue their reconciliation efforts.

 

The Wunlit conference, as with the other peace initiatives in these “People-to-People” processes,

reflected a practice initiated and organized by the NSCC in which commanders would arrange security, local chiefs would primarily negotiate settlement and local church and traditional religious leaders would bless the reconciliation effort.clxxxi Getty images show SPLA soldiers providing security for the conference preparation in Thiet and dancing in celebration with their weapons at the closing ceremony highlighting their presence and involvement.clxxxii

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The subsequent People-to-People peace conference held in November 1999 in Waat whereby Christian Aid and World Vision, amongst others, were thanked as sponsors demonstrates the international involvement in the southern peace processes at this time. It underscores the level of conflict driven by southern factions against southern Sudanese that demanded intervention to help end the conflict.clxxxiii While the conferences did not resolve the differences amongst the conflicting southern factions, in fact the conference at Liliir saw the creation of a new armed faction,clxxxiv they did seek to resolve ongoing localised, community conflicts.

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IX. CONCLUSION

Southern Sudan is a vast area of sub-Saharan Africa that has experienced years of natural and politically driven disasters that have brought intervention on a significant scale from the world’s humanitarian agencies. The SPLM/A used these humanitarian disasters to build crucial international relationships with the humanitarian agencies involved to provide them with valuable resources. Through unprecedented international intervention they were able to create a powerful propaganda machine that had international resonance. Narratives around religious persecution and later ‘oil wars’ ensured allied responses from organisations aligned with these causes: even if the ideological and spiritual elements of the ‘Movement’ were found wanting.