VI. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

In 1999, Lundin commissioned a socio-political assessment of the area around Block 5A:

 

“The study, conducted both at the Lundin head office in Geneva and in Sudan, was based on an analysis of reports on the political and human rights situation in Sudan, on interviews with company representatives in the head office and in Sudan, and on meetings with members of the Government of Sudan and humanitarian organizations. It also included a visit to the concession area.”ccxvi

 

The Company believed that community engagement was vital to the economic success of the concession and that its investment had a positive impact on the local community. These community engagement projects provide a powerful counter-narrative to the inaccurate portrayal of the Company and its actions by certain advocacy groups and NGOs. Lundin’s community development projects had the sole aim of contributing to the welfare of the local populations, particularly those situated in the concession area. In order to achieve this, the Company carried out consultations with representatives from the local population, tribal leaders, representatives of the state and the Government of Sudan, and other relevant stakeholder groups to determine key needs. This assessment was developed into a fully fledged Community Development and Humanitarian Assistance Program (CDHAP) in 2001.ccxvii

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As explained by the Vice President of Corporate Responsibility:

 

“In order to ensure that its projects were relevant, Lundin had consulted with a number of local actors, in particular non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were active in the area. With their assistance, it identified areas of need where it felt it could make a contribution, such as the supply of fresh water, health, education and capacity building.”ccxviii

 

A footnote to this report explains that:

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“The uniqueness of Lundin’s approach did not go unnoticed. Indeed, in a meeting with representative of an international NGO, Dr Riek Machar, who had then defected from the Government of Sudan, stated that Lundin was different in that it had consulted with the local people and tried to involve them in its activities.”ccxix

 

Through the CDHAP, Lundin wished “to demonstrate to the local and central authorities that it was concerned with the interests and welfare of the population and was prepared to make significant contributions, despite the fact that it would not obtain any revenues from its activities for a number of years.”ccxx Even during the Company’s temporary suspensions of activities in 2001 and from 2002 onwards, services to the community continued to be rendered in the two main towns of the area, Rubkona and Bentiu, and in surrounding villages, such as Thoan.

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Examples of the Company’s community development projects included the following:

 

a) Fresh water supply

• Water tanks were installed along the AWR and water wells drilled. Containers were distributed to the population and existing water wells repaired.

• Construction of water filtration units in Rubkona and Thoan to take drinking water from the Bahr el Ghazal river to service the needs of the local population.

 

b) Education

• Distribution of equipment such as pens, paper, and blackboards to schools in the area, before providing more substantial support for buildings and for teachers in the form of bonuses.

• Building and/or supporting six schools by the end of 2001, in Kwergen/Dorang, Kwosh, Thar Jath, Koo, Thoan, and Adok, with the number of pupils totalling 585.

• Construction of a permanent school in Thoan.

• Recruiting and supporting the training of 24 women from all over the area as qualified midwives, by enrolling them in midwifery school.

• Hiring of local staff for its operations. A programme to train vector control specialists and computer analysts was also initiated.ccxxi

 

c) Health

• To prevent the spread of disease spreading more significantly during the rainy season communicable diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea, respiratory infections, bilharzia, river blindness; Lundin distributed water, blankets, mosquito nets, tarpaulins, and soap to the local population, sprayed huts and swamps to control mosquitoes, constructed latrines, and facilitated vaccination programmes carried out by health organisations.

• Between five and eight Sudanese doctors, as well as more than a dozen paramedical staff – all locals – were employed by Lundin. They worked in mobile tent clinics, temporary straw clinics, as well as in hospitals in the area. Word spread about these clinics and thousands of patients were treated by the Company’s medical staff.

• A permanent clinic was built in Thoan, which was larger than the mobile tent clinics and had a greater patient capacity.ccxxii Near on 12,800 patients received treatment at the Thoan clinic.

 

d) Capacity Building

• Lundin distributed farm tools and fishing tackle to local entrepreneurs. In particular, the Company collaborated closely with an international NGO based in Rubkona which helped thousands of families in the area with their farming and fishing techniques and provided tools to enable people to cultivate their own land.

• The Company funded an artificial limbs factory in Khartoum and transported Southerners to be fitted with new limbs.

• A drop-in centre and orphanage for internally displaced street boys in Khartoum was funded by the Company. The drop-in centre still exists today and is fully funded by the Lundin family. The orphanage (known as Lundin House) has become a day school.

• Two veterinarians were engaged to run a vet station in Thoan in order to tend to local cattle, and a number of mobile vet clinics and a veterinary station were set up with eight local para-veterinarians trained by the Company. Numerous livestock were treated by the veterinarians and para-veterinarians with vaccination and vector control campaigns. Breeding programmes were established for the improvement of livestock.

• A programme was established to train local people to work in key occupations, such as paramedics, veterinarians, nurses, and brick layers.

• A brick-making factory employing 48 villagers was established in Thoan, providing bricks for local construction. Over 100,000 bricks were produced in a period of one month.

• A women’s development centre was set up in Thoan.

• A nursery garden, maintained by two locals, planted over 150 shade trees.

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These projects are similar to the focus of international aid agencies, operating in the region at this time. For example, Veterinaires sans Frontieres-Switzerland (VSF-CH) were operating animal health projects in Western Upper Nile; as did the German Agro Action organisation, providing agricultural and livestock assistance.ccxxiii

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Sweden was also a notable contributor of humanitarian aid to Sudan and channelled the bulk of its financial assistance through other bodies, such as the ‘Health Pooled Fund’ (HPF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).ccxxiv Contrary to the claims of the NGOs there is evidence of Lundin’s commitment to support and provide much-needed infrastructure for the local population that clearly undermines the allegations the company has faced.

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VII. LUNDIN’S CODE OF CONDUCT AND STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

Mindful of the potential impact of oil operations and the environment, Lundin developed a Code of

Conduct.ccxxv A video made in 1998 showcases its operating philosophy that in order for the Company to be successful, people on whose land it is situated must benefit from its presence.ccxxvi The Code of Conduct was finalised and adopted by the Company’s Board of Directors at its meeting on 21st February 2001. It formalised the Lundin’s philosophy and has since served as a guide for the Company’s activities worldwide.ccxxvii It recognises the Company’s responsibilities towards employees, host countries, local communities and the environment. In the Code, the Company “committed itself to act in a fair and honest way, to observe both national and international laws, and ‘to act in accordance with generally accepted principles on the protection of human rights and the environment.’”ccxxviii

 

After the implementation of the Code of Conduct, the Company decided: “that in view of the competing claims being made about the impact of oil in the region, it needed not only to widen the scope of these contacts but also to alter the content of its discussions to include socio-political issues.”ccxxix

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VIII. LUNDIN’S PEACE CONTRIBUTION

Although Lundin generally refrained from getting involved in the political affairs of a country,ccxxx Carl Bildt, who was the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Balkans from 1999 to 2001 and a member of the Company’s board volunteered to use his vast experience to promote peace in the region.

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Bildt met with a number of high-level representatives from all sides, as well as representatives of the key nations acting as peace mediators, such as Kenya, Norway, the UK, the USA and ccxxxi Sweden as a member of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Partners Forum Support Group for Sudan was also involved in the peace process. During the 1997 peace discussions, Sweden provided significant support including contributions to the IGAD peace fund.ccxxxii Sweden was publicly and actively engaged and directly supported events taking place in Sudan to ensure peace, which provided a clear lead for Lundin to follow.

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Key Company consultations in relation to peace were held with an array of stakeholders, from the

Sudanese government, local government, local Nuer communities, the Swedish government, the humanitarian community, the UN Commission on Human Rights, NGOs, think tanks, the media, negotiators, including representatives of southern Sudan, the national and local government of Unity State among others.ccxxxiii Many of these meetings are set out in the Company’s account of its actions in “Lundin History in Sudan: 1997-2003” which is a full record of the steps taken.ccxxxiv Unlike the SPLM/A and certain advocacy groups, none of these agencies advocated for the withdrawal of oil companies. The summary below sets out Lundin’s commitment to peace, respect for human rights, the need for a long-term political solution in Sudan and the stance that peace between the parties was essential for economic development of Sudan and its activities:

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• May 2001: Press conference at which Lundin set out its responses to various allegations made by Christian Aid in its report “Lundin Oil in Sudan”. Unity State governor John Dor stated that people in the area were happy with what the oil companies were doing.

• July 2001: Meeting with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Osman Ismail.

• July 2001: Meeting with Riek Machar (Nuer leader, former Vice President of Sudan and subsequent Vice President of South Sudan).

• January 2002: Series of meetings with President al-Bashir, the Sudanese Minister of Energy and Mining Awad Ahmed El Jazz, the Sudanese Minister of External Relations Chol Deng.

• January 2002: Meeting with Mustrif Siddiq, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, previously responsible for negotiating the Nuba Ceasefire Agreement.

• January 2002: Meeting with Peace Advisor in the Presidency of the Government of Sudan, Dr Gazi Salahuddin Atabani

• January 2002: Meeting with Riek Machar to discuss “1 Sudan 2 Systems” solution.

• February 2002: Meeting with Minister El Jazz to emphasise the Company’s position that the only solution was a long-term peace agreement.

• March 2002: Meeting with Riek Machar and Bol Gatkuoth Kol, a representative of the South Sudan Relief Agency, to discuss how the Company and other oil companies could contribute to the peace process.

• 4th March 2002: Letter to Sudanese Ambassador to Sweden, H.E. Youssif Saeed concerning the importance of a sustainable peace.

• 19th March 2002: Letter to Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani, Peace Advisor in The Presidency of the Government of Sudan about the agreement signed by the Government of Sudan on the protection of civilians.

• 13th June 2002: Letter to H.E. Ambassador Yousif Saeed in relation to the current peace process resulting in a ceasefire agreement.

• 23rd June 2002: H.E. Ambassador Yousif Saeed noted Lundin’s willingness to assist in the peace process, and its “noble goals”. The Ambassador also stated that he knew that the Company was “not in any way involved in politics” but that it was “working for development in Sudan”.

• July 2004: Teleconference with Riek Machar, in which Lundin continued to advocate for peace.

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IX. WORKING WITH THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT

Lundin maintained a dialogue with relevant Swedish authorities as to their operations in Sudan upon entering the country and continued that dialogue when criticism of their presence was published by the media in 2001. At no stage did the government advise, direct, or otherwise intervene to halt the Company’s exploration and appraisal activities.

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On 21st February 2001 in the Swedish Parliament, Foreign Minister Anna Lindh answered questions on the presence of oil companies in Sudan and allegations made of a cordon sanitaire and forced displacement in Western Upper Nile.ccxxxv Ms Lindh stated: “The Swedish government expects all the companies, including those active in the oil sector, to conduct their business so that the conflict does not worsen or lead to human rights violations.”ccxxxvi Referring to the EU’s engagement with Sudan in trying to further peace efforts, Ms Lindh explained that “the EU has just over a year ago resumed political dialogue with Sudan” and Sweden had paid approximately 95 million SEK in aid to Sudan in 2000.ccxxxvii She informed the Swedish Parliament that the UN Special Rapporteur “does not conclude that the oil companies should leave Sudan”.ccxxxviii

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On 21st March 2001, Lundin issued a press release welcoming the statement by Anna Lindh and the fact that she wanted a “Government enquiry into the company’s operations in Sudan.” The press release explained that Lundin had contacted Mr Gerhart Baum, the United Nations’ Human Rights Rapporteur in Sudan, in order to offer assistance to shed light on the alleged violations of human rights in connection with the construction of a road to the Company’s exploration drilling site in southern Sudan. Adolf Lundin, as Chairman of the Board, welcomed all initiatives to clarify the situation in Sudan and stated that: “allegations of human rights violations are in disagreement with perception of Lundin Oil’s employees working in Sudan. Since the allegations are very serious, we are using every effort to investigate these events.”ccxxxix

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Adolf Lundin wrote on 26 March 2001 to Anna Lindh and welcomed “active Swedish and European involvement both in terms of humanitarian efforts in the country and policies it applies to achieve a stable peace.” He wrote that it was “important to obtain information directly from the site” and that a journalist from Sweden had already visited the area and had given “a picture very significantly different from that previously dominating the Swedish media.” Lundin also invited the Swedish Ambassador to Sudan to visit its operations to acquire an independent opinion of the situation in the area. ccxl

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It is noteworthy that in a resolution of 20 April 2001, the UN Security Council did not request or demand foreign oil companies to leave the country. The UN Special Rapporteur was instead given an extended mandate and stated that he was prepared to visit the oil fields to create his own picture of the situation. Lundin invited him to visit its site of operations.

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The UN Security Council (of which Sweden was a member between 1997-1998) could have adopted

recommendations (non-binding) or decisions (binding) under Article 25 of the Charter, with or without sanctions on Sudan and its oil activities, but critically did not do so. The Security Council had not even considered any recommendations or decisions of that kind. This was against a backdrop of knowledge of what NGOs were reporting about southern Sudan and the activities of the oil companies. This knowledge came via the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, which included major NGOs, such as HRW and Amnesty International. Neither the Security Council nor any other United Nations body called on Sudan or the oil companies to cease their operations or to leave the country.

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The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anna Lindh replied on 25th April 2001 to Adolf Lundin, referring to the Resolution and underlining the “Swedish government’s support for the UN’s continued involvement” and that the Special Rapporteur was “prepared to visit oil areas to be able to create his own picture of the situation” and that she would therefore “await UN Report conclusions” before requesting a “particular investigation or Swedish official visit.”ccxli 

 

In answer to questions on Christian Aid’s Scorched Earth report in a further debate in Parliament on 2nd May 2001,ccxli i Ms Lindh explained:

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“When it comes to what is happening in Sudan, the oil and the possible Swedish investigation, the situation is that the UN Rapporteur has only made a brief description of conditions in Sudan. He criticizes the business, but he also notes that he himself has not been there. Since he himself has not been there, he does not dare to make any recommendations in the most sensitive areas, namely: Do companies stay, or should they leave? That is one of the most important questions we had in the Swedish debate. The Special Rapporteur is now on his way to southern Sudan to get a picture of the situation and is then coming back with a report with recommendations. I had hoped it would have been completed by today. I still want to see the UN report, and read through their

recommendations before deciding on a Swedish investigation. If we get enough clear recommendations from the UN, perhaps no Swedish investigation is needed?”

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“As for Sudan, we must return as soon as we have seen the information from the Special Rapporteur. It is true that there are many organizations and media that have portrayed the situation. But it is still the UN, which is the guardian of international law. Therefore, we want to await the UN report.”ccxliii

 

Neither the UN nor the Swedish government in the spring of 2001 or anytime thereafter made any

requests or demands that Lundin cease its activities in Sudan.

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It was not until many years later in 2010 that the Swedish Prosecution Authority embarked on an investigation into the Company’s operations in Sudan. This was notwithstanding the fact that Lundin had made its own investigations and found the substance of the NGO allegations about the Company to be untrue.

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X. INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

A World Bank publication from 2003 makes the point that: “The conflict began before the discovery of oil in commercial quantities. Oil is therefore not a prime cause of the conflict, but the future distribution of oil revenue is one of the main outstanding issues in the IGAD peace negotiations.”ccxliv

The UN relief organisation Operation Lifeline Sudan was concerned with having “full access to all areas of the country in order to be able to provide humanitarian relief in the case of crises.” Lundin’s Vice President of Corporate Responsibility explained: “As the company had itself offered assistance to internally displaced people fleeing from areas of natural or man-made catastrophe, it shared the view of the OLS that unrestricted humanitarian access was required and raised this issue in its meetings with Government and Nuer representatives.”ccxlv

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In March 2001, the UN Special Rapporteur Gerhart Baum visited Khartoum and Nairobi. The statement he gave at that stage was made shortly after the release of the recently published Christian Aid report. Mr Baum did not however visit Block 5A. The Special Rapporteur did not request that the activities of the oil companies stop, nor did he hold them responsible for the matters upon which he reported in his oral statement to the UNCHR.

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Following the Special Rapporteur’s visit, Lundin’s CEO issued a statement in which he noted with regret the Rapporteur’s failure to visit Block 5A to see for himself the true state of affairs on the ground and his reliance upon “biased and unsubstantiated evidence.”ccxlvi Both Carl Bildt and the Vice President of Corporate Responsibility continued to meet and engage with the Special Rapporteur.

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EU Ambassadors visited Sudan and Block 5A between 6-8th May 2001. Unlike the UN Special Rapporteurs, the EU Ambassadors visited the locations of the alleged displacements, including Thar Jath within Block 5A. The trip was prompted by the civil society allegations of oil related displacement and the objective was to investigate and verify based on first- hand observations and took place without any representatives from the Government of Sudan.

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A report dated 23rd May 2001 from Pereric Hogberg, at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs summarised the findings of the EU Ambassadors following their visit to Sudan from 6-8th May 2001. He explained that the delegation found no evidence that Sudanese government troops had been forcing people to flee their villages in the oil fields or that the government of Sudan carried out a scorched earth tactic to prepare for the oil industry. The mission noted that the oil companies had improved the infrastructure, which had improved local people’s access to marketplaces, health and water.ccxlvii

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The Special Rapporteur re-visited Sudan from 2-14 October 2001 and again did not request that the activities of oil companies and, in particular, those of Lundin, cease.

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The Special Rapporteur visited Bentiu, just outside Block 5A, on 7 October and was received by representatives of Lundin. He did not, despite the Company’s request, visit any of the Company’s places of work, operational sites or travel along the road, which was alleged to be linked with the displacement of people. Instead, he visited Pariang situated in another consortium’s Block. In the town of Rubkona his time was not spent with the Company. Lundin’s Vice President of Corporate Responsibility wrote to the Special Rapporteur after his visit to express her disappointment that he had not visited their sites or viewed the community work. However, it must be noted the Special Rapporteur did not hold the Company, nor oil companies in general in any way responsible for the conflict. He acknowledged that: “the SPLM/A controls access to 80% of the people in southern Sudan, it does not necessarily represent all of them”.ccxlviii On 29th October 2001, the Vice President of Corporate Responsibility wrote to the UN Special Rapporteur on Sudan extending an invitation for a further visit so that he could see the concession area.ccxlix

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Lundin engaged with local NGOs whose mission was to assist the population through local humanitarian or development projects as well as NGOs based outside Sudan promoting special interests such as human rights and religious rights. The Company funded local organisations’ projects (even on a confidential basis after it had become too risky for the NGOs to be associated with oil firms). Working with agenda-driven NGOs became more difficult, especially with those who dogmatically viewed any involvement of oil as contrary to establishing peace.

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Both Amnesty International and the Church of Sweden believed in the benefits of constructive

engagement with companies operating in Sudan and met with Lundin representatives on a number of occasions.ccl The Company invited representatives from both organisations to visit its concession area, but because of the suspension of oil activities and the subsequent sale of assets, these visits never materialised. Nonetheless, some of their views and recommendations were taken into consideration and, where appropriate, integrated into the Company’s business conduct.ccli

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Following the publication of Christian Aid’s Scorched Earth report on 13th March 2001, on 19th March 2001, Lundin issued its policy for operations in Sudan. It was emphasized inter alia that the Company would support initiatives that could lead to a lasting peace. The next day, the Company’s CEO arrived in Sudan together with the filmmaker and journalist Bengt Nilsson, a Swedish journalist who knew the area well. The purpose of the trip was for the CEO to check the truth of the accusations with his own eyes, with an experienced journalist. This trip included visits to Rubkona and Bentiu and is welldocumented. There were no signs that villages were cleared, burned or destroyed.

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During the CEO’s stay in Sudan, a Board meeting took place on 22nd March 2001 by telephone. cclii A representative of Christian Aid was invited to the meeting to give a more detailed account of the

accusations in Scorched Earth. The allegations were taken seriously by Lundin. Christian Aid was informed of the findings made by the CEO but this information appeared to fall on deaf ears. The following day, Christian Aid published a press release in which its allegations were made again.

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On 22nd March 2001, in an interview with German media, Sue Garrood who worked for the aid organisation German Agro Action (with offices in Bentiu, Rubkona and Mayom) confirmed the findings made by Lundin that were in contrast to what had been claimed by Christian Aid. When asked if the people in the area held the oil companies responsible for being forced to flee, Sue Garrood replied: “They never mention the oil companies and we have in this area 3,000 households that we are giving seed tools and agricultural extensions and they are not coming in saying “oh it’s terrible we have been displaced because of the oil,” they will come and say, “we have been displaced because of the factional fighting.”ccliii

 

In an interview on 9th April 2001 the journalist Bengt Nilsson who visited Sudan with the CEO, Nilsson stated: “The battles had nothing to do with road construction. The expulsion is instead a result of guerrilla attacks and the counter-attacks of the pro-government militia. I’ve got a consistent picture.”ccliv

 

In May 2001, Lundin published its response entitled “Lundin Oil in Sudan.”cclv This response countered in detail the allegations made by Christian Aid and was based on investigations undertaken by the Company, which included the accounts of its employees, NGOs and local people’s first-hand observations on the ground. This document analyses each of the inaccuracies and misrepresentations set out in the Scorched Earth report and is publicly available. In spite of the comprehensive rebuttal issued by Lundin, Christian Aid continued to spread their message with no regard for the information provided.

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XI. CONCLUSION

Lundin entered Block 5A on the commitment of peace, both on the back of the Political Charter and the KPA, at a time when its home country Sweden promoted constructive engagement through encouraging investment. Constructive engagement was recognised by the EU and UN as a policy, which was intended to encourage peace. In the wake of this policy, many foreign oil firms were encouraged to invest in Sudan.

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There were no EU or international sanctions that prohibited a European company from carrying out business in Sudan. Lundin engaged deeply with the local community through various community contributions and in 2001 rolled out its Community Development and Humanitarian Assistance Program. The Company also directly addressed allegations of human rights abuses, reflected on its own conduct and role in the country and consistently communicated information transparently about its operations to all local and international stakeholders. Contrary to the claims of the NGOs there is evidence of Lundin’s commitment to support and provide much-needed infrastructure for the local population that undermines the allegations the company has faced.

 

When allegations were made against Lundin, it carried out immediate checks. It cooperated with

relevant and responsible agencies in Sweden and internationally. In May 2001, the Company published its response, “Lundin: Oil in Sudan” which countered in detail allegations made by Christian Aid.

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At no time did the Swedish government advise, direct or intervene to halt the oil operations. Neither did the UN make any such demands. EU Ambassadors in Sudan found that there was no evidence that the Government of Sudan had driven people out of villages pursuant to a scorched earth policy. They found that accusations made by civil society groups were inaccurate and based on hearsay rather than on objective observations.